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SECONDARY LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10(b)
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1934 AND RULE
10b-5 POST-STONERIDGE
ROBERT VAN DE VEIRE*
INTRODUCTION
Despite the inability of the Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific Atlanta, Inc.1 decision to completely settle the debate over the
extent of secondary liability in securities fraud actions, the case has opened
discussion of the extent to which liability can and should be extended to
secondary actors. The Stoneridge decision has been predominantly
considered to be the result of the United States Supreme Court's (the
"Court") disapproval of potentially widespread imposition of scheme
liability to secondary actors. 2 As such, the Stoneridge decision may mark
the end of private securities actions alleging "scheme liability" under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "'34 Act") 3 and
Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder. 4 However, this decision does not have
to end the possibility of private actions under Rule 1Ob-5 or completely
insulate secondary actors in such schemes from liability to the shareholders
*Robert M. Van De Veire - B.A. Economics, Drew University; J.D., St. John's University School of
Law 2010.
1 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
2 See Todd G. Cosenza, Applying Stoneridge to Restrict Secondary Actor Liability under IOB-5, 64
Bus. LAW. 59, 59 (Nov. 2008) (noting that the Court's decision raised questions regarding the precise
scope of scheme liability to secondary actors); see also Andrei Takhteyev, Who is to Blame? (and What
is to Be Done?): Liability of Secondary Actors Under Federal Securities Laws and the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1539, 1553 (2009) ("[T]he Court reiterated the premise that only
primary violations of Section 10(b) are subject to private suits and a plaintiff seeking to recover against
a secondary actor in a securities fraud action must prove every element of the primary violation . . .
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 Ob-5 (2007); see Howard K. Gordon & Tracy V. Schaffer, The SEC's Role in
Pursuing Secondary Actors Following 'Stoneridge', LAW.COM, May 27, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp
/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=1202421673135 (discussing the SEC's authority to pursue secondary actors
as aiders and abettors of primary securities law violators); see also Ann Maxey, SEC Enforcement
Actions Against Securities Lawyers: New Remedies vs. Old Policies, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 537, 565
(1997) ("The [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995] authorized the SEC to seek injunctive
relief against secondary actors.").
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of the injured corporation. This Note proposes that where the secondary
actor participated in a fraudulent scheme and received a benefit at the
expense of the target corporation, and hence the shareholders of that
corporation, said shareholders should be permitted to bring a suit to recover
any ill-gotten gains from the secondary actors. Thus, the private right of
action should be preserved to allow shareholders to recover from secondary
actors, while insulating the corporation from liability, as the corporation
itself is not the guilty actor.
First, this Note will cover the basics of liability under §10(b) of the '34
Act and Rule lOb-5. In that context, this Note will discuss the decision in
Central Bank Securities Litigation and the enactment of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act. Next, this Note will compare and
contrast the three tests developed in the district courts to determine liability
for secondary actors under I Ob-5. Third, this Note will discuss the decision
in Stoneridge Investment Partners. Fourth, it will address the issue of the
liability of secondary actors post-Stoneridge. It will discuss the concept
that stock drop actions are a "zero sum" game, the burden of enforcement
Stoneridge has placed on the government, and two district court decisions
post-Stoneridge. Finally, this Note will articulate why the decision in
Lopes v. Viera is a step in the right direction.
I. BASICS OF lOb-5 LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10(b)
Following the 1929 stock market crash that led to the Great Depression,
Congress passed two securities acts: the Securities Act of 1933 ("the '33
Act") and the '34 Act.5 One of the purposes of these acts was to protect
investors from fraudulent securities practices through "'numerous carefully
drawn civil remedies and criminal penalties."' 6 The '34 Act contained
§ 10(b), which was intended to be a "'catchall' antifraud provision."7 Under
§ 10(b), it is unlawful for any person to:
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance of
such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
5 See Albert J. Matricciani, Jr., Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.:
Substitution of Congressional Intent with Caveat Emptor, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 187, 188-89 (2009)
(explaining that "the purpose of which was to protect investors from fraudulent securities activities.").
See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) ("Federal regulation of
transactions in securities emerged as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929.").
6 Matricciani, Jr., supra note 5, at 189 (citing Hochfelder, 45 U.S. at 195).
7 Id. (citing Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983)).
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Congress also gave the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
authorization to create regulations under the two acts. Thus, in 1942, the
SEC enacted rule 1Ob-5 pursuant to § 10(b). Rule 1Ob-5 states that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.8
The courts have implied a private right of action pursuant to Rule 1Ob-
5.9 A successful claim under lOb-5 requires: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant, (2) scienter, (3) a
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or
sale of a security, (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, (5)
economic loss and (6) loss causation.
Courts have determined that a misstatement is "material" if the statement
or omission substantially alters the "total mix" of information available to
the reasonable investor.10 The scienter element is satisfied if the plaintiff
can show that the defendant had "'the intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud."'"1 The plaintiff must also prove that he relied on the deceptive
information, which is very difficult to prove on an individual level. 12 In a
class action, however, there is a rebuttable presumption of class-wide
reliance in two situations: (1) where the claims are primarily ones of
fraudulent omissions of information that the defendant had a duty to
disclose ("Affiliated Ute presumption"),13 and (2) under the fraud-on-the-
8 §240.10b-5.
9 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 61 ("As is well-known, the implied private right of action under
Rule lOb-5 was recognized in the lower courts as early as 1946 and acknowledged by the Supreme
Court in 1971."); see also In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
10 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 62; see also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976).
11 Cosenza, supra note 2, at 62 (citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193).
12 See id. ("A securities class action generally fails if proof of individual reliance is required."); see
also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 1996).
13 "Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of
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market doctrine, under which reliance is presumed when a false statement
becomes public. 14
A. Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b)
Beginning in the late 1960s, federal courts began to permit private aiding
and abetting actions under § 1 0(b).15 Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Ins. Co. was the first case to impose such liability. 16 Brennan involved the
fraudulent sale of stock in Midwestern United Life Ins. Co. ("Midwestern
Life") by the defendant brokerage firm Dobich Securities Corp.
("Dobich").17 Dobich led the plaintiffs to believe that it had sold them
stock in Midwestern Life when, in actuality, no purchase of stock had been
made.' 8 Rather, Dobich used these funds as operating capital.19 The
plaintiffs in Brennan alleged that the defendant, Midwestern Life, knew of
this fraud and aided and abetted Dobich in its commission.20 The Court, in
permitting a private aiding and abetting action, noted that the '34 Act is
directed at maintaining a "securities market that is free from fraudulent
practices" and that "[t]he investor's protection is the paramount
consideration . . . ."21
B. Central Bank
In 1994, in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank ofDenver,22
the Supreme Court limited the responsibility secondary actors had to
reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in
the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this
decision. This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite
element of causation in fact." Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972)
(internal citations omitted).
14 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 62; see also In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196 (E.D. Pa.
2008).
15 See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 169 (1994);
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F.Supp. 673, 675 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
16 259 F.Supp. 673 (1966).
17 Id at 675.
18 Id
19 Id
20 Id. "A basic philosophy of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is disclosure and is directed
toward the creation and maintenance of a post-issuance securities market that is free from fraudulent
practices. The investor's protection is the paramount consideration of much of the federal securities
legislation and, in particular, of the 1934 Act here involved. The effect on an investor of an issuer
corporation's failure to disclose improper activities of a brokerage firm dealing heavily in the issuer's
stock, where the broker's activities create an appreciable risk of loss to that investor, may be just as
dangerous and equally as damaging as a failure by the issuer to disclose information of its own
improper activities affecting the value of its stock." Id. at 680.
21 Id at 680.
22 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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shareholders of the subject corporation by eliminating aiding and abetting
as a basis of liability in an action brought under §10(b).23 The Court took a
textual approach in reaching this holding. Specifically, the Court held that
"[b]ecause the text of §10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting ... a
private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under
§10(b)."24
The events underlying this decision involved a default on 1986 and 1988
issues of bonds by the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building
Authority.25 Central Bank served as indenture trustee for the $26 million
issue to finance real estate development by AmWest. 26 As the bonds were
secured by land, AmWest, under the indenture, was required to submit
annual reports to ensure that the value of the land was the requisite 160%
of the value of the outstanding principle and interest on the bonds.27 In
1988, the report submitted by AmWest showed appraisal values nearly
identical to those in 1986, despite the declining real estate market. 28 The
underwriter became concerned that the 160% mark was not being met.29
After an in-house appraiser with Central Bank reviewed the new report, he
suggested that Central Bank have an outside appraisal conducted. 30
However, Central Bank delayed this appraisal at the request of AmWest,
and the issuer ultimately defaulted on the 1988 bonds, including $2.1
million worth of bonds purchased by the respondents, First Interstate Bank
of Denver and Jack K. Naber. 31 Respondents then brought suit, claiming
violation of §10(b) of the '34 Act.32 The Court found for the petitioner,
holding that the language of the statute did not allow for aiding and
abetting liability.33
Although the Court did not find there to be liability with respect to
Central Bank, it did mention that primary liability could still be imposed
provided that the secondary actor violated Rule 10b-5.34 The Court was
23 Id at 191 (holding that the language of the statute does not sustain a private lawsuit for aiding
and abetting under § 10(b)); see Gordon & Schaffer, supra note 4 (noting that the Court in Central Bank
did not find that § 10(b) liability extended to aiders and abettors).
24 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
25 Id. at 167.
26 Id
27 Id.
28 Id
29 Id
30 Id. at 167-68.
31 Id. at 168.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id
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clear, however, that each and every requirement of Rule lOb-5 must be met
for there to be liability.35
After the Central Bank decision, Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").36 The PSLRA provided for aiding and
abetting liability, but only allowed the SEC to bring such actions. 37
Consistent with Central Bank, Congress did not permit a private right of
action for aiding and abetting. However, it made clear that it was intent on
continuing the prosecution of aiders and abettors. This forced private
plaintiffs to show that the aider and abettor met every element of primary
liability under §10(b).38
II. LIABILITY PRE-STONERIDGE
By leaving the door open for primary liability to be imposed on
secondary actors without offering much guidance to the lower courts as to
how a secondary actor could "make a material misstatement," the Supreme
Court further complicated this area of the law.39 The application of
secondary actor liability remained inconsistent. 40 Therefore, having little
guidance from the Supreme Court in the Central Bank decision as to what
it means to "make" a material misstatement, the circuit courts instituted
various standards to determine if a statement was "made." 41 The courts
sought to trek through the grey areas between secondary and primary actor
liability without violating the Supreme Court's prohibition on aiding and
abetting liability.42  /
35 "Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative
device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies
may be liable as a primary violator under 1 Ob-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability
under Rule J0b-5 are met." Id at 191 (citing Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section
10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REv. 80, 107-08 (1981)).
36 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006); Richard A. Booth, The Future of Securities Litigation. 4 Bus. & TECH.
L. 129, 131-32 (2009).
37 See § 78a. See also Booth, supra note 36; § 78t(e).
38 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2; see also Cosenza, supra note 2, at 66.
39 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 66; see also Taavi Annus, Scheme Liability Under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 Mo. L. REV. 855, 859-60 (2007).
40 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 66; see also Annus, supra note 39; Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 169.
41 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 66; see also Annus, supra note 39; Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191
(stating that any person or entity who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement
may be held liable as a primary violator of 1Ob-5, assuming all the requirements under lOb-5 are met).
42 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 66; see also Annus, supra note 39; Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 169-
70 (noting that a theory of secondary liability was not viable to allow for a claim of aiding and abetting
in light of recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal securities law).
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A. The Creator Standard
The SEC proposed its own test, "the creator standard," to clarify whether
a statement was made.43 The SEC sought to create a moderate standard
which would not cast too broad of a net, so as to encompass all secondary
actors, but not grant active participants in a fraud essentially a free pass by
forcing plaintiffs to clear too high of a hurdle.44
Under the creator standard, a secondary actor is primarily liable to a third
party investor if it "creates" a misrepresentation, regardless of to whom the
statement is publicly attributed. 45 To meet the standard of reliance, the
plaintiff must prove that the secondary actor 1) knew or was reckless in not
knowing that investors would rely on this statement, 2) knew or was
reckless in not knowing of the existence of the material misstatement, and
3) played so significant a role in the creation of the misrepresentation that
the secondary actor could be fairly characterized as an author or co-author
of the document.46
The Third Circuit eventually adopted the creator standard in Klein v.
Boyd.47 The Klein court held that a law firm could be primarily liable under
§ 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 even if the investing public was unaware of its
participation in drafting the misleading documents. 48 The court articulated
that no actual endorsement of the document on the part of the preparing
attorney is needed. 49 The court reasoned that, by participating in the
preparation of a document with the knowledge that it will be publicly
distributed to investors, the attorney has elected to speak to the investing
public, regardless of whether he or she is given credit. 50
43 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 67; see also Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Amicus Curiae at 14-16, Klein v. Boyd, Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261, 1998 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P
90,136 (3d Cir.), vacated for reh'g en banc, 1998 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 90,165 (3d Cir. 1998), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/klein.txt.
4 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 67; see also Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
supra note 43.
45 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 67; see also Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
supra note 43.
46 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 67; see also Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
supra note 43.
47 1998 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 90,136 (3d Cir.). "A lawyer who can fairly be characterized as an
author or a co-author of a client's fraudulent document may be held primarily liable to a third-party
investor under the federal securities laws for the material misstatements or omissions contained in the
document, even when the lawyer did not sign or endorse the document and the investor is therefore
unaware of the lawyer's role in the fraud." Id.
48 Id
49 Id. at T 90,324. See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 66 (citing Klein, 1998 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at
90,318).
50 Klein, 1998 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 90,136. "The Third Circuit also opined that a lawyer
preparing a document with the knowledge that it will be given to investors 'has elected to speak to the
201 11] 1005
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B. The Substantial Participation Test
The Ninth Circuit chose to allow plaintiffs to cast a larger net than the
Third Circuit by employing a broader standard for reliance that became
known as the "substantial participation test."51 For a secondary actor to be
primarily liable under this standard, it need only have substantially
participated in the preparation of materially false or misleading
statements. 52
Like the creator standard, the substantial participation test relies only on
the secondary actor's knowing participation in the preparation of the
misleading public disclosures. 53 However, what matters under this standard
is that investors relied on misstatements that were made to the investing
public, not that the public knew who actually made them. 54 Even if the
public cannot directly attribute the misstatements to a secondary actor, the
misleading statements were still made to and relied upon by the market,
and as such, "anyone intricately involved in their creation and the resulting
deception should be [held] liable." 55
C. The Bright Line Test
In almost direct contrast to the substantial participation test, the Second,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits took a strict approach to determine whether a
material misstatement had been made. 56 These courts applied the "bright
investors, even though the document may not be facially attributed to the lawyer."' Cosenza, supra note
2, at 68 (citing Klein, 1998 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 190,318.
51 Klein v. Boyd, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4121 (3d Cir. 1998). See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 66.
52 See Klein, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS at 4121; see also Cecil C. Kuhne, Expanding the Scope of
Securities Fraud?: The Shifting Sands of Central Bank, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 25, 37 (noting "[t]he Ninth
Circuit has been the most vocal proponent of expanding liability to secondary actors under the guise of
a substantial participation test.").
53 See In re Software Toolworks Inc. v. Painewebber Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 1994)
(defining the mental state requirements of the substantial participation test), cert. denied sub nom; see
also Montgomery Securities v. Dannenberg, 516 U.S. 907 (1995); Cosenza, supra note 2, at 66
(explaining that the substantial participation test focuses on a party's knowing participation in preparing
a misrepresentation, rather than the identity of the statement's particular author).
54 See In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F.Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that although
the misstatements and omissions at issue could not be attributed to a particular author, the fact that they
were relied upon was sufficient to hold any party involved in their creation liable); see also Cosenza,
supra note 2, at 66 (discussing the holding in In re ZZZZ Best).
55 In re ZZZZ Best, 864 F.Supp. at 970.
56 See Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001) (following the Second
Circuit in requiring that the misstatement at issue be publicly attributable to the defendant); see also
Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (requiring that a misrepresentation be
specifically attributed to a particular actor in order to impose liability), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104
(1999); Anixter v. Home-Stake Products Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that
liability should only be imposed upon those who themselves make false or misleading statements);
Cosenza, supra note 2, at 65 (attributing the stricter standard used in these circuits to the courts'
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line test" in making their determinations. 57 To satisfy the bright line test,
the secondary actor must have actually published the material
misstatement. 58 Mere participation in its creation is insufficient to impose
liability. 59 Simply put, a plaintiff can only prove reliance under this
standard if the secondary actor is named in the document, has signed the
document, or is otherwise identified to investors at the time the
misrepresentation is published to the market.60
III. STONERIDGE
In response to the overwhelming grey area between primary and
secondary actor liability under Rule 1Ob-5, private plaintiffs attempted to
bridge the gap by arguing that secondary actors should be held liable under
a theory that became known as "scheme liability." 61 Under "scheme
liability," the plaintiffs do not attempt to reach secondary actors based on
1Ob-5(b), which prohibits making fraudulent statements or making certain
omissions. 62 Rather, in proving "scheme liability", plaintiffs base their
claims on Rule 1Ob-5(a) or (c), which prohibit the use of any "device,
scheme or artifice to defraud" or "to engage in any act, practice, or course
struggle to respond to the demise of aiding and abetting liability).
57 See Zienba, 256 F.3d at 1205 (following the Second Circuit's preference for the bright line
test); see also Wright, 152 F.3d at 175 (choosing the bright line test over the substantial participation
test); Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226-27 (refraining from calling the test a bright line but recognizing that it
provides more guidance than the substantial participation test); Cosenza, supra note 2, at 65 (specifying
the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits as those which applied the bright line test).
58 See Ziemba, 256 F.3d at 1205 (requiring that misstatements be publicly attributable to
defendants in order to impose liability); see also Wright, 152 F.3d at 175 (explaining that "a defendant
must actually make a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b).");
Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226-27 (requiring that defendants themselves make the false statements in order to
be held liable); Cosenza, supra note 2, at 65 (contrasting this requirement with the more broad
requirement of mere participation under the substantial participation test).
59 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 65 ("Under the bright line test, the secondary actor must actually
publish a material misstatement that is attributed to it, rather than merely participating in its creation.");
see also Anixter, F.3d at 1226-27 ("[W]e conclude that in order for accountants to 'use or employ' a
'deception' actionable under the antifraud law, they must themselves make a false or misleading
statement").
60 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 65 (stating that a secondary actor is only liable if they are named
on the document and have signed it); see also Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997)
(interpreting case law to determine that anything short of conduct will not trigger liability under Section
10(b)).
61 See Scope of Secondary Actor Liability, 122 HARv. L. REv. 485, 485 (Nov. 2008) ("[Pirivate
plaintiffs began arguing that participation in a scheme to violate the securities laws could be treated as a
primary violation, a theory known as 'scheme liability."'); see also Annus, supra note 39, at 862
(explaining how plaintiffs have begun to use scheme liability to fill the gap).
62 See Scope of Secondary Actor Liability, supra note 61, at 487 (discussing the limits of secondary
actor liability); see also Annus, supra note 39, at 859 (mentioning that "plaintiffs have alleged that
secondary actors have been so closely involved in drafting financial and other corporate statements that
they have actually made those statements in violation of Rule lOb-5(b).").
201 1] 1007
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of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person."63 Plaintiffs argue that by participating in allegedly deceptive
conduct, the secondary actor engaged in a "scheme to defraud investors." 64
However, in 2008, the Supreme Court rejected the "scheme liability"
theory when it affirmed the Eighth Circuit decision in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.65 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, framed the issue before the Court as whether
§10(b) liability can properly attach to an entity that participated in a
scheme to violate the statute, but did not actually make a public
misstatement or fail to disclose material information. 66 The Court
ultimately concluded that because there was no public misstatement or
failure to disclose, "the investors cannot be said to have relied upon any of
respondents' deceptive acts in the decision to purchase or sell securities,"
meaning that "the requisite reliance cannot be shown." 67
Stoneridge involved allegedly fraudulent practices engaged in by Charter
Communications, Inc. ("Charter"), a cable television provider, and two of
its cable box providers, Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc.
(collectively the "Suppliers"). 68  Charter sought to meet Wall Street
expectations for cable subscriber growth and operating cash flow. 69 To do
this, Charter enlisted the aid of the Suppliers. 70 A deal was arranged
surrounding the purchase of set top cable boxes from the Suppliers. 71
Under the arrangement, Charter would overpay twenty dollars per box
supplied with the understanding that the Suppliers would return the
overpayment by purchasing advertising time from Charter. 72 Charter
received no monetary benefit from the arrangement; instead, it ultimately
63 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). See Annus, supra note 39, at 862 (stating how courts have
applied 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c)).
64 Matricciani, Jr. supra note 5, at 192 ("The theory imposes liability on any actor who participates
in a scheme to defraud investors."). See Susan E. Hurd & Elizabeth Skola, The Stoneridge Investment
Partners Decision: What Difference Has It Made? 28 No. 1 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. I
(2009) (determining the necessary causal connection for secondary actors to be liable); see also §
240.10b-5.
65 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
66 See Scope of Secondary Actor Liability, supra note 61, at 487 (mentioning how Justice Kennedy
frames the question); see also Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 152-53 (discussing how
secondary actors agreed to arrangements lead to misleading financial statements that affected prices).
67 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 166-67.
68 Id. at 153-54. See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 69 (introducing the parties to the lawsuit and the
nature of the alleged fraud).
69 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 153.
70 Id. (stating that "[t]o help meet the shortfall, Charter decided to alter its existing arrangements
with [the Suppliers].").
71 Id.
72 Id.
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resulted in Charter giving away free advertising time. However, Charter
recorded the advertising purchases as revenue, and contrary to generally
accepted accounting principles, it capitalized the set top boxes. 73 The
arrangement between Charter and the Suppliers was concealed by
backdating the transactions, in order to make them appear unrelated. 74 In
this way, Charter successfiully increased its apparent cash flow by $17
million, a figure represented to the SEC as accurate in various filings. 75
The plaintiffs filed a class action suit against the Suppliers, alleging
§10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 violations, in that the Suppliers knew or were in
reckless disregard of Charter's intent to defraud the market. 76 The Court
noted that the Suppliers had no part in preparing or disseminating Charter's
financial statements. 77
The decision primarily addressed the inability of scheme liability to
satisfy the justifiable reliance element of a §10(b) claim.78 The Court
identified reliance as a key element to imposing liability under § 10(b):
[R]eliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant's deceptive acts
is an essential element of the §10(b) private cause of action. It
ensures that, for liability to arise, the 'requisite causal
connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a
plaintiff s injury' exists as a predicate for liability. 79
The Court considered the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance,
but ultimately rejected its applicability to this case. Since it was undisputed
that the Suppliers engaged in the deceptive conduct along with Charter at
Charter's behest, the Court focused on the proximity of the defendants'
alleged deceptive acts to the actual harm incurred by the plaintiffs and
whether the actions of the Suppliers took place in the "investment
73 Id. (explaining that by projecting false revenue, it enabled "Charter to fool its auditor into
approving a financial statement showing it met projected revenue and operating cash flow numbers").
See Venture Line, Capitalize Definition, http://www.ventureline.com/GlossaryC.asp (last visited May
6, 2009) (defining "capitalize" as "[t]o capitalize, in general business, it is to supply with capital, as of a
business by using a combination of capital used by investors and debt capital provided by lenders; or, to
consider expenditures as capital assets rather than expenses. Specifically, it is to: . . . b) record capital
outlays as additions to asset accounts, not as expenses . . .").
74 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 155 (noting that "[tihe new set top box agreements
were backdated to make it appear that they were negotiated a month before the advertising
agreements.").
75 Id.
76 Id
77 Id.
78 See Matricciani, Jr. supra note 5, at 193.
79 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 159 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
243 (1988)).
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sphere."80 The Court reasoned that actions outside the investment sphere
could not reasonably be believed to have been relied upon by investors. 81
In rejecting the Affiliated Ute presumption, the Court noted that the
Suppliers had no duty to disclose, and reiterated that the public had no
knowledge of the Suppliers' acts during the relevant time period. 82 Thus,
the Court concluded that reliance could only be shown through an "indirect
chain" that proved "too remote for liability." 83 Additionally, the Court
noted in dicta that conduct may be a permissible method of deception under
§ 10(b).84
While it is clear that meeting all the requirements of § 10(b) will lead to a
finding of primary liability, when examining the future implications of the
Stoneridge decision, the issue of where the boundaries of liability on
secondary actors under §10(b) lie is far from concrete. 85 The "too remote"
language chosen by the Court is vague and offers little guidance to the
district courts. 86 The broad language of the decision was initially viewed as
restricting, if not completely eliminating, secondary actor liability under
§10(b).87
80 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 70 n.94. In Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court first articulated
the fraud-on-the-market theory of liability in securities actions. In Basic, Combustion Engineering
engaged in discussions with Basic's officers and directors, seeking to acquire the company. The day
before Basic's board approved the merger, Basic's president, Max Mueller, publicly stated that Basic
was not involved in any merger discussions. After the merger went through, Max L. Levinson, a Basic
shareholder, sued to recover damages resulting from the artificially depressed value of his shares as a
result of Mueller's misstatements. Here, the Court set forth the fraud-on-the-market theory as
establishing a rebuttable presumption of reliance on the defendant's misstatements, because they were
made publicly to an open and developed securities exchange. The logic behind this theory is that all
information regarding a security affects the price of that security, so when a statement is made to the
open market, it affects the market price of that security. Therefore, an investor in that security is
presumed to have relied upon that information. See Basic, 485 U.S. 224.
81 Basic, 485 U.S. at 249.
82 Id. at 243.
83 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 158.
84 Id. "The Court of Appeals concluded petitioner had not alleged that respondents engaged in a
deceptive act within the reach of the §10(b) private right of action, noting that only misstatements,
omissions by one who has a duty to disclose, and manipulative trading practices (where 'manipulative'
is a term of art, see, e.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 US. 462, 476-477 (1977)) are
deceptive within the meaning of the rule. If this conclusion were read to suggest there must be a specific
oral or written statement before there could be liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, it would be
erroneous. Conduct itself can be deceptive, as respondents concede. In this case, moreover,
respondents' course of conduct included both oral and written statements, such as the backdated
contracts agreed to by Charter and respondents." Id (citation omitted).
85 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 59 (discussing the decision in Sioneridge); see also Donald C.
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and Third-Party
Liability Under Rule 10B-5, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 2125, 2126 (2010) (explaining the "mishmash").
86 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 59; see also Langevoort, supra note 85 (discussing how the
"mishmash" led to vague interpretations); Rodney D. Chrisman, Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta: Do
Section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5 Require a Misstatement of Omission?, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 839, 878-
79 (2008) (displaying how the goals of the court were not fully accomplished).
87 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 59; see also Chrisman, supra note 86 (explaining the confusing
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did allow for deceptive conduct to
serve as a basis for liability. 88 In reflecting on the Court of Appeals
decision, the Court noted that (and the respondents conceded that)
"[c]onduct itself can be deceptive." 89 Thus, requiring that a written or oral
statement be required for a finding of a violation of §10(b) and Rule lOb-5
would ultimately contravene the purpose of the law.90 For example, insider
trading is a fraud properly conducted only through stealth,91 whereby a
widespread public statement either oral or written would undercut the
perpetuator's purpose. 92 The lessened standard adopted by the Court to
include conduct as a method of deception may open the door to more
litigation.93 This is counter to the Court's professed objective of reducing
unnecessary litigation.94
IV. POST-STONERIDGE
A. What Stoneridge Has Meant to Those Who Suffer Injury
While the boundaries of liability of secondary actors are far from
concrete, what has indeed been established is that the hurdle to satisfy
§10(b) liability is significantly higher. Stoneridge has proven difficult on
plaintiffs, as it has raised the bar as to what they must prove to show that a
misstatement was made, thereby making it difficult to fulfill the reliance
requirement of a §10(b) claim. Stoneridge has effectively shortened the
arms of plaintiffs seeking to reach secondary actors who may have
participated in the commission of a fraud, but who essentially failed to sign
their name to their crime. For example, shortly after the Stoneridge
decision was handed down, the Court threw out a similar claim for $40
holdings effect on secondary actors).
88 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 59; see also Chrisman, supra note 86, at 875 (discussing how
conduct itself can be deceptive).
89 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 158.
90 Id. ("If this conclusion were read to suggest there must be a specific oral or written statement
before there could be liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, it would be erroneous.").
91 See Booth, supra note 36, at 132 ("[Insider trading] is a fraud that depends on stealth."); see also
U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) (reasoning that classic insider trading is marked by
disclosure of nonpublic information).
92 See Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 158 (explaining that it is erroneous to conclude
a specific oral or written statement must be made for liability to attach); see also Cosenza, supra note 2,
at 72 (stating that it is doubtful whether an oral or written statement is necessary for liability to attach).
93 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 71 (calling attention to the fact that deceptive behavior can lead to
liability); see also Chrisman, supra note 86, at 916 (stating that more litigation is an unintended
consequence).
94 See Cosenza, supra note 2, at 71; see also Chrisman, supra note 86, at 916 (noting that the Court
was desperate to avoid more litigation).
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billion by Enron investors against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith,
Inc. and other firms alleging that they had aided and abetted Enron in
falsifying financials. 95 The court held that it would be impossible for the
plaintiffs to prove that they relied on the deceptive behavior. 96 Thus, the
Court has shown that pleadings based on claims similar to the allegations in
Stoneridge now run the risk of being thrown out before they are heard on
the merits. The concern over the constraining impact that Stoneridge
potentially could have was evident even to the Justice Department. 97
Before the Merrill Lynch case was thrown out, the Justice Department
prepared an amicus brief on behalf of the SEC, which sided with the Enron
investors, but was never filed.98
Jonathan Macey, a professor of corporate law at Yale University,
summarized the reaction to the Stoneridge decision when he stated,
If you're in the bubble fantasy world of the plaintiffs bar and think
there's social value in bringing suits, then Stoneridge was wrongly
decided ... It permitted people who were pretty active participants in an
accounting fraud to be let off as defendants. But if you say these suits are
like kudzu or cancer on corporate America, with massive amounts of costs
and no benefits, then Stoneridge cuts away massive amounts of civil suits
against extraneous parties.99
a. Zero-Sum Game
For some commentators that disfavor "stock-drop class actions,"
Stoneridge represents an opportunity for the Court to make fundamental
changes to litigation surrounding such class actions.100 At the heart of these
proposed reforms is the contention that stock-drop situations are a zero-
sum game, meaning that "there is no fraud because there is no damage."' 0
95 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig., 610 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
96 Id. See Terry Carter, How Lawyers Enabled the Meltdown And How They Might Have
Prevented it, 95 JAN A.B.A.J. 34, 39 (Jan. 2009).
97 See Carter, supra note 96 ("In a friend-of-the-court brief prepared by the Justice Department on
behalf of the SEC, the agency had sided with Enron investors."); see also Lawyers USA, Justice
Department Backs Defendants in Enron-Related High Court Case (Aug. 2007) (noting that the SEC
urged the Justice Department to file an amicus brief in support of the investors).
98 See Carter, supra note 96 ("Following a complaint to the White House by Secretary of Treasury
Henry Paulson, the solicitor general reversed field and filed a brief for the other side."); see also Enron
Investors'Hopes Ride with Supreme Court Case, http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/storysection=news/local
&id=5691772, Oct. 6, 2007 (last visited Nov. 29, 2010) ("But the Justice Department solicitor general,
after pitches from President Bush and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, rejected the SEC's
recommendation and filed a brief on the side of Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta.").
99 Carter, supra note 96 (quoting Jonathan Macey).
100 Booth, supra note 36, at 135. See Langevoort, supra note 85, at 2125.
101 Booth, supra note 36 at 135.
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Stoneridge is an example of such a stock-drop class action.102 Investors
bought Charter stock at a price that supposedly reflected the actual value of
the company. 103 However, in reality, the price paid by these investors was
actually inflated due to Charter's improper revenue reporting. 10 4 But what
is important in a case such as this is that the corporation itself did not sell
shares in a public offering at the inflated price.os Instead, shares were
purchased on the open market from other investors.1 06 Thus, it was other
investors that benefitted from Charter's fraudulent practices, rather than
Charter itself.107 Additionally, the investors who sold shares benefitted by
the exact amount that the stock price was inflated, which is equivalent to
the losses of the investors who bought shares during this time.108
Admittedly, while there is a loss suffered by some investors, their
collective loss is shared among other investors as an improper gain.109
Therefore, in viewing the market as a whole, there is no real net loss.110
Moreover, for the investor who buys before the misrepresentation affects
the market and holds until after it comes to light, there is no net effect on
102 See id. at 136; see also Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 153 (2008).
103 Booth, supra note 36, at 136; Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 153.
104 Booth, supra note 36, at 136; Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 153.
105 See Booth, supra note 36, at 136 ("[Stoneridge] is not a case alleging that Charter itself had
fraudulently sold stock to the public at an inflated price . . . it is not a case in which Charter obtained
money by a fraudulent public offering and should be made to give it back.'); see also Nelson Waneka,
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: Rethinking the Fraud-On-The-Market
Presumption and the Policy Considerations Permeating the Court's Decision, 86 DENV. U. L. REV.
303, 313-15 (2008) (noting that the agreements in question had no economic substance and resulted in
overstated revenue, which was disseminated to the public and which occurred after the company's
initial public offering).
106 See Waneka, supra note 105 (stating that this is not a case in which Charter obtained money
though fraud); see also Stoneridge Investments Partners, LLS v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 443 F.3d 987
(8th Cir. 2005) (noting the claim that analysts relied on the inflated revenues and operating cash flow in
making stock recommendations).
107 See Waneka, supra note 105 (describing this situation as a classic stock-drop class action,
where individuals other than Charter benefited from misrepresentations); see also Stoneridge
Investments Partners, 443 F.3d 987 (asserting that Charter was only liable for improper accounting
procedures, and did not benefit from such practices).
108 See Waneka, supra note 105 (mentioning how the losses incurred by the bad luck of buyers are
offset dollar for dollar by the good luck of investors who happen to sell at that same time); see also
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 178 (describing how the Securities Fraud statutory language prohibits only
the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act).
109 See Waneka, supra note 105 (highlighting that the standard approach to damages in a bad news
case is to award the difference between the price paid by the buyer and the market price after corrective
disclosure); see also Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Chellgren, No. Civ. A. 02-220-DLB, 2004 WL
1348880, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2004) (noting that gains that one company receives at the expense of
others in the market place as a result of improper reporting practices are improper).
110 Booth asserts that securities fraud in the context of a stock drop action is a zero-sum game.
Booth, supra note 36, at 134. A "zero sum game" is defined as "[a] situation in which one participant's
gains result only from another participant's equivalent losses. The net change in total wealth among
participants is zero; the wealth is just shifted from one to another." See http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/z/zero-sumgame.asp (last visited April 19, 2009).
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that investor at the time the fraud comes to light."'1
However, investors in the subject company are still injured by the
impending litigation's effect on the stock price. When evidence of the
misrepresentation comes to light, the share price theoretically returns to
where it should have been had there been no fraud perpetrated. This
equilibrium point is where the market values the shares of the subject
company.11 2 Yet, once word of a possible class action and potential
liability is released to the market, share prices drop below this equilibrium
point. When litigation is threatened and this news becomes public, the
market reacts accordingly.1 3 The subject company now has a potentially
large payout pending the result of the litigation. Therefore, shares in the
subject company become less attractive to potential investors. Hence, the
market values the shares of the subject company less, driving the price per
share down. 114 In this way, a direct suit against the subject corporation can
only serve to compensate investors at the expense of the innocent
shareholders of the corporation who continue to hold their shares through
the litigation.
Moreover, investors can also suffer injury when the company engages in
a fraud because of the outflow of money or other benefits to the secondary
actors. For example, in Stoneridge, Charter was effectively giving away
advertising time to Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta to perpetuate the
fraud.115 Even if not especially valuable to Charter, there was still some
Ill See Waneka, supra note 105 (describing the situations where a potential claim of securities
fraud due to misrepresentation would arise); see also Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities
Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 24 (2007) (concluding that there is no
negative effect in a situation where the holder buys before misrepresentation, and holds until after
disclosure).
112 See Investopedia.com, Economics Basics: Demand and Supply, http://www.investopedia.com/
university/economics/economics3.asp (last visited May 5, 2009) ("In the real market place equilibrium
can only ever be reached in theory, so the prices of goods and services are constantly changing in
relation to fluctuations in demand and supply."); see also Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient
Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 373, 379 (1983)
("[W]here many competing experts analyze the same information, trading induced by analysts will
bring a particular security's price promptly to a dynamic equilibrium point ... [a]s the product of such a
process, the price of a security represents the consensus of the various competitors in the market.").
113 See Investopedia.com, Stocks Basics: What Causes Stock Prices to Change?,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/stocks/stocks4.asp (last visited May 5, 2009) (discussing the
effect of positive or negative news, and other factors, on a company's stock price); see also Andre
Baker, How to Evaluate Stock Investment Risks, E-ARTICLEs, Mar. 2007, http://e-articles.info/e/a/titlel
How-to-evaluate-stock-investment-risks ("Just the threat of a large lawsuit can weigh heavily on a
company's stock price.").
114 See Stocks Basics: What Causes Stock Prices to Change?, supra note 113 (explaining that there
are various factors that cause a company's stock to be less attractive to potential investors, and thus
cause stock price to go down); see also Baker, supra note 113 (advising potential investors to "[a]void
all stocks facing litigation with a potentially costly outcome.").
115 See Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 160.
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value of which the shareholders were being deprived through the actions of
the guilty parties. 116 It is these same investors who are then injured again
when the stock price is driven down by pending litigation as mentioned
above.
B. Burden on the Government
The Supreme Court has made clear that while it did not expressly allow
for private enforcement, the SEC would still be able to pursue aiders and
abettors.11 7 The SEC's "enforcement power is not toothless.""l8 For
example, since 2002, the SEC has received over $10 billion in
disgorgement funds and monetary penalties.119 Despite the success the SEC
has had in recent years of enforcing violations, the burden on government
enforcement continues to increase. 120 In only allowing actions to be
brought by the SEC, the Supreme Court has made the SEC the sole aiding
and abetting watchdog. The SEC's New York Regional Director, Mark
Schonfeld, even stated that "the inability of the private bar to bring actions"
could increase the burden on the SEC.
There is a difference between actions brought by private litigants and
those brought in an enforcement action by the SEC.121 For example, the
116 See id. at 154 ("The transactions, it is alleged, had no economic substance; but, because
Charter would then record the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalize its purchase of the set top
boxes, in violation of generally accepted accounting principles, the transactions would enable Charter to
fool its auditor into approving a financial statement showing it met projected revenue and operating
cash flow numbers."); see also Seth S. Gamm, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and the Supreme Court's Attempt to Determine the
Issue of Scheme Liability, 61 ARK. L. REV. 453, 458 (2008) (explaining how such advertising
arrangements negatively affect shareholders).
117 See Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 158 (stating that section 104 of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 "directed prosecution of aiders and abettors by the SEC ...
[the] implied private right of action does not apply to aiders and abettors."); see also Gordon &
Schaffer, supra note 4, at n.35 ("Following the ruling in Central Bank, Congress enacted section 104 of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which authorized the SEC to enforce securities
fraud violations against aiders and abettors.").
118 Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 166.
119 See id. ("Since September 30, 2002, SEC enforcement actions have collected over $ 10 billion
in disgorgement and penalties, much of it for distribution to injured investors."); see also SEC, 2007
Performance & Accountability Rep. 26, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2007.shtml ("As a
result of SEC enforcement cases, approximately $13.8 billion in disgorgement and penalties from FY
2003 through FY 2007 were ordered to be paid to the SEC, courts, or other appointed trustees.").
120 See Gordon & Schaffer, supra note 4 (explaining that SEC enforcement officials have
acknowledged a greater burden on the SEC to enforce misconduct following Stoneridge); see also H.
Lynn Stallworth & Dean Digregorio, Improper Revenue Recognition: To Help Clients Avoid SEC
Violations, Internal Auditors Need To Understand The Revenue Management Practices That Can Lead
To Material Misstatements, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Jun. 2004 (stating that the SEC has increased
enforcement activity and filed a record number of accounting and auditing enforcement actions in
2003).
121 See Gordon & Schaffer, supra note 4 (discussing how although after Stoneridge private
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SEC has two options in pursuing secondary actors; it can either bring an
enforcement action for primary liability under §10(b), or it can bring an
aider and abettor action. In the latter action, district courts employ a
variety of standards as to the state-of-mind the SEC must show the
defendant possessed in committing the fraud.122 Some courts require as
little as "recklessness," while others require "knowing."l 23 Additionally,
unlike private litigants, the SEC need not prove the reliance element in
order to succeed in an action for primary liability.
Yet, while the role of the SEC has seemingly expanded in enforcing
§10(b), the tools available to the SEC have been limited.124 Like private
litigants, the SEC is bound by the Supreme Court precedent in interpreting
the scope of §10(b).125 In this way, the SEC may be limited in the future by
securities claims alleging scheme liability against secondary actors under Section 10(b) will likely end,
the SEC will remain authorized to pursue these claims); see also Securities Exchange Commission v.
Richetelli, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68923 at 11-12 (Conn. 2010) (stating that individuals who act as
aiders and abettors are not liable in private suits for violating Section 10(b), but that the SEC may seek
to impose liability on these individuals).
122 See Gordon & Schaffer, supra note 4 ("The scienter or state-of-mind standard the SEC must
meet to sustain aiding and abetting claims differs depending on the jurisdiction involved."); see also
Matthew L. Mustokoff, Proving Scienter in SEC Aiding and Abetting Cases: Courts Apply Tougher
Standard in Recent Decisions, INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW ADVISOR (May 1, 2006)
available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/
article-IGl-151326917/proving-scienter-sec-aiding.html (stating that district courts have differed as to
the proper standard for demonstrating scienter in litigation against aiders and abettors under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
123 See Gordon & Schaffer, supra note 4 (explaining that while the D.C. circuit has held that
recklessness is required in SEC aiding and abetting actions, at least two district courts in the Second
Circuit require the SEC to prove knowing misconduct). Compare Ponce v. Securities & Exchange
Commission, 345 F.3d 722, 737 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that although Ponce may have had knowledge,
recklessness was sufficient to satisfy the aiding and abetting scienter standard) with Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Kushner Promotions, 417 F. Supp. 2d 326, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that
knowing misconduct must be shown).
124 See Hurd & Skola, supra note 64, at 5 ("The Supreme Court acknowledged in Stoneridge that
the SEC alone was authorized to bring aiding and abetting claims under § 10(b). Yet in the wake of
Stoneridge, the question remained whether the decision would have an effect on the SEC's ability to
prosecute claims for primary liability under § 10(b)."); see also Lawrence Scheinert, Countering The
Stoneridge Critics: The Prudence of Maintaining the Status Quo for Lawyer Liability Under Rule 10B-
5, 11 FL. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 28 (stating that the Stoneridge court gave the SEC encouragement to
increase enforcement activity).
125 "One recent decision from the First Circuit, SEC v. Tambone, sheds some light on this strategy
post-Stoneridge. Tambone involved an enforcement action brought by the SEC against two senior
executives of a company serving as the primary underwriter for certain mutual funds. The SEC
contended that these two individuals were primarily liable under § 10(b) (in addition to being aiders and
abettors) through their use of false and misleading fund prospectuses to sell mutual fund shares. In
assessing whether such primary liability claims were possible under Stoneridge, the First Circuit
observed that . . . the failure to plead reliance, which was fatal in Stoneridge, would not necessarily
preclude the SEC's claims in Tambone. Rather, the primary area of dispute between the parties was
whether the defendants had 'made' a materially false or misleading statement for which primary
liability may exist under § 10(b). The First Circuit held that, by using misleading prospectuses despite
an underwriter's duty to review and confirm the accuracy of their contents, these defendants had made
implied statements of their own to potential investors that they had a reasonable basis to believe that
key statements in the prospectuses were accurate and complete." Hurd & Skola, supra note 64, at 5-6.
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the Supreme Court precedent set in Stoneridge, because defendants may
now allege that they never made the misleading statements. 126 This could
potentially handicap the SEC, which has historically brought an action
against a party involved in a § 10(b) violation as both a primary actor and a
secondary actor who acted as an aider and abettor.127
C. Post-Stoneridge Decisions
a. In Re DVI Inc. Securities Litigation
Only eight months after the Stoneridge decision, the district court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania referenced it in the class certification in In
Re DVI Inc. Securities Litigation.128 Plaintiffs there sought class
certification regarding claims brought against the law firms Clifford
Chance LLP and Clifford Chance U.S. LLP (collectively "Clifford
Chance"). 129
DVI Inc. was a firm that financed the working capital needs of medical
providers by securing credit through healthcare receivables. 130 In 1997 and
again in 1998, DVI issued notes to raise capital. 131 During this time,
Clifford Chance served as outside counsel to DVI.132 Shortly after DVI
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2003, DVI investors filed a securities
fraud class action suit against the officers and directors of DVI, its
independent auditor, its largest shareholder, and Clifford Chance. In their
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that these parties participated in a massive
scheme to inflate the price of DVI securities. 133
Clifford Chance contended that class certification as against itself would
be inappropriate.134 It argued that neither the fraud-on-the-market
presumption nor the Affiliated Ute presumption was applicable, as Clifford
Chance did not make a public misstatement that affected DVI stock or
In Tambone, the court held that the SEC must abide by the Court's decision in Central Bank. SEC v.
Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 446 (1st Cir. 2010).
126 See Hurd & Skola, supra note 64, at 5-6 (speaking about the recent decision of SEC v.
Tambone); see also Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 158-59 (2008) (stating that the
conclusion that § 10(b) does not extend to aiders and abettors is erroneous).
127 See Hurd & Skola, supra note 64, at 6-7 (noting the risk of abusive litigation was too great);
see also Stoneridge Investment Partners, 552 U.S. at 165 (discussing how secondary actors are subject
to criminal penalties and civil enforcement by the SEC).
128 249 F.R.D. 196 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
129 Id. at 198.
130 Id
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 In re DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 198.
134 Id. at 207 (stating the two presumptions established by the Supreme Court).
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notes, nor did they owe a duty of disclosure to DVI investors. 135
However, plaintiffs alleged that Clifford Chance should be held liable
under §10(b) and Rule lOb-5 because it substantially participated in a
scheme to defraud investors. 136 Plaintiffs alleged that Clifford Chance
assisted DVI in all aspects of the scheme, including "drafting fraudulent
public financial reports . . . and deflecting inquiries from the [SEC]."l37
Plaintiffs alleged that not only did Clifford Chance have knowledge of the
scheme, but also that they had a "unique role in initiating and
masterminding" it.138 Additionally, plaintiffs cited specific language from
Stoneridge indicating that conduct can be deceptive. 139 Plaintiffs contended
that they were entitled to a class-wide presumption of reliance as against
Clifford Chance even though it was not specifically identified in the
fraudulent public disclosures.140 Plaintiffs argued that reliance is tied to
causation, and thus, it was for the district court to decide whether the
actions of Clifford Chance were "too remote" in relation to the injury
suffered by DVI's investors. 141
The court relied largely on the reasoning in Stoneridge in coming to its
determination that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance. 142 The court noted that while Stoneridge
recognized the relationship between causality in reliance when applying
scheme liability under §10(b), it emphasized that the Supreme Court was
reluctant to expand reliance based on scheme liability. 143 The court
ultimately concluded that the fraud-on-the-market theory did not apply
because "none of [Clifford Chance's] alleged conduct was publically
135 Id (noting that in cases which involve primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance
is not a prerequisite to recovery).
136 Id. at 199.
137 Id
138 In re DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 217.
139 Id. at 216-17.
140 Id. at 217.
141 Id
142 Id.
143 "In rejecting scheme liability, the Court notes that plaintiffs under this theory could not
overcome the objection that investors in the cable operator 'did not in fact rely upon [the supplier's]
own deceptive conduct.' Similarly this Court finds that Lead Plaintiffs have not overcome the objection
that investors in DVI did not rely upon the allegedly deceptive conduct of Clifford Chance. Though
Lead Plaintiffs allege that Clifford Chance knew of the scheme, and at times took a more active part in
assisting DVI in the scheme, the fact remains that none of this alleged conduct was publically disclosed
such that it affected the market for DVI's securities. Accordingly, this Court finds that Lead Plaintiffs
are not entitled to the fraud on the market presumption to establish reliance with respect to Clifford
Chance. Additionally, the Court finds that the Affiliated Ute presumption is equally inapplicable
because Clifford Chance owed no duty of disclosure to DVI's investors." In re DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 217-
18. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 384 (5th Cir.
2007).
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disclosed such that it affected the market for DVI's securities."1 44
Therefore, plaintiffs could not prove class-wide reliance.145
b. Lopes v. Vieira
In March 2008, the district court for the Eastern District of California
applied the Stoneridge reasoning in Lopes v. Vieira.146 However, the court
in Lopes came to a different conclusion as to whether a law firm could be
held liable under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, ultimately holding that the
defendants could be liable since they had passed the substantial
participation test. 147
In Lopes, the plaintiffs invested in Valley Gold LLC, a company founded
by George Vieira, allegedly for the sole purpose of defrauding investors. 148
The fraud was allegedly modeled after one which Vieira had perpetuated
through Suprema Specialties, Inc., a publicly traded company, for which he
was then under investigation.149
To perpetuate the new fraudulent scheme, Vieira needed to create Valley
Gold to fill the role that Suprema had previously held.150 Downey Brand
LLC, a California law firm, was retained by Vieira for the purpose of
forming Valley Gold.151 In that capacity, Downey prepared a business plan
for Valley Gold and an offering memorandum for the sale of shares in
Valley Gold.152 Included in this memorandum were detailed financial
forecasts and the company's business plan.153
In January 2004, Vieira pled guilty for his criminal involvement in a
scheme to inflate the profitability of Suprema.154 As part of this plea deal,
Vieira was banned from working in the cheese and dairy business, forcing
him to step down as CEO of Valley Gold.15 5 Shortly thereafter, Valley
Gold defaulted on its payment obligations to the plaintiffs for milk already
supplied.156
Plaintiffs sued Downey and Vieira, among others who aided in the
144 In re DVI, 248 F.R.D. at 218.
145 Id.
146 543 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
147 Id. at 1201.
148 Id at 1155.
149 Id. at 1154.
150 Id.
151 Lopes, 543 F.Supp. 2d at 1156.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. See generally Lopes v. Vieira, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104417 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2010).
155 Lopes, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. See generally Lopes, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104417.
156 Lopes, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
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creation and operation of Valley Gold.157 Downey moved to dismiss,
arguing that the Ninth Circuit test did not apply and citing Stoneridge in
support.158 Downey contended that they were at most an "aider and
abettor," since none of the allegedly false statements that were made
publicly could be attributed to the law firm.159
While recognizing the Stoneridge decision, the court distinguished the
facts in Stoneridge from those of Lopes, and recognized that for a
secondary actor to be liable, the elements for a §10(b) claim must be
met. 160 The court noted that unlike the Suppliers in Stoneridge, Downey
"played a significant role in drafting and editing" the fraudulent offering
memorandum.161 Therefore, they passed the substantial participation test as
set forth by the Ninth Circuit in In re Software Toolworks Inc. Securities
Litigation.162 In determining reliance post-Stoneridge, the court concluded
that Downey's conduct was not too remote in relation to the injury.163 The
court also suggested that a law firm or an attorney, as opposed to a counter-
party to a contract, could have an implied duty to investors, depending on
the facts of each individual case. 164
CONCLUSION: APPROPRIATELY PLACING BLAME AND WITH IT LIABILITY
The goal of securities fraud litigation should be to return ill-gotten gains
from those who benefitted to the injured parties. In a situation such as
Stoneridge, the subject company did not benefit from the fraudulent
practices of insiders and the secondary actors (absent a public sale of shares
from the company's own holdings). The benefit then is shared between the
insiders and secondary actors. Therefore, it stands to reason that it is those
very parties that both perpetuated the fraud and benefitted as a result who
should be held liable to those who are injured.
Stoneridge essentially cut off the prospect of successful litigation against
these secondary actors, or at a minimum made it harder to succeed. This
result is counter to what should be the purpose of the rule. However, the
district court in Lopes took a step in the right direction. In narrowing the
scope of Stoneridge and continuing the application of the SEC-created
157 Id
158 Id. at 1177-78.
159 Id
160 Id at 1175.
161 Lopes, 543 F. Supp. 2d. at 1176.
162 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994).
163 Lopes, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
164 Id. at 1178.
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substantial participation test, the court boosted future plaintiffs' ability to
recover against secondary actors who participate in the production of
fraudulent or deceptive financial statements. Under Stoneridge logic, it is
possible that a court could hold that the plaintiffs in Lopes failed to meet
the reliance element of 1Ob-5 because the actions of the defendant were
questionably remote. However, the court in Lopes took a step in the right
direction in applying the Ninth Circuit substantial participation test.

